Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India

Jessica Goldberg, Mario Macis and Pradeep Chintagunta

No 25279, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study whether and how peer referrals increase screening, testing, and identification of patients with tuberculosis, an infectious disease responsible for over one million deaths annually. In an experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment centers in India, we find that small financial incentives raise the probability that existing patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in cost-effective identification of new cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms: peers have private information about individuals in their social networks to target for outreach, and they are more effective than health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested.

JEL-codes: I1 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hea, nep-net and nep-soc
Note: DEV EH
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Jessica Goldberg & Mario Macis & Pradeep Chintagunta, 2023. "Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, vol 15(1), pages 259-291.

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Journal Article: Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India (2023)
Working Paper: Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India (2019)
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