Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace

Mounu Prem, Andrés F. Rivera, Dario Romero and Juan Vargas

No 16385, Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario

Abstract: We study the unintended consequences of the recent peace process in Colombia, that ended over five decades of internal armed conflict with the FARC insurgency. Using a triple differences empirical strategy, we show that the permanent ceasefire that started in December 2014 in the context of the peace negotiations was followed by an increase in the killing of social leaders in previously FARC-dominated territories, perpetrated by other armed groups seeking control of these areas. Con- sistent with our interpretation that local social leaders are killed to thwart collective action and mobilization at the municipal level, we show that the targeting of social leaders is not explained by the behavior of the overall homicide rate and that it is exacerbated in municipalities with weaker state capacity and an inefficient local judi- ciary. Our results suggest that partial pacification processes can exacerbate violence by other existing armed groups, aimed at controlling pacified territories.

Keywords: Social leaders; Peace process; Armed conflict; Territorial control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2018-06-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/id/840 ... f49614d5d/dt218R.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace (2019)
Working Paper: Killing social leaders for territorial control: the unintended consequences of peace (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000092:016385

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Facultad de Economía ().