On a Shareholder Constrained Efficient Criterion for Strategic Firms

Luigi Ventura

No 1994066, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this note the decision problem of a strategic firm in a general equilibrium setting is analyzed. It is shown that under many respects the problems arising are similar to those encountered in an incomplete markets set-up, and a well known criterion used under incompleteness of markets can be applied to the imperfectly competitive framework. It is also shown under what conditions profit maximization leads to the same production decision as utility maximization.

Date: 1994-12-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: On a shareholder constrained efficient criterion for strategic firms (1999)
Working Paper: On a shareholder constrained efficient criterion for strategic firms (1989)
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