On a shareholder constrained efficient criterion for strategic firms

Luigi Ventura

No 1989031, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: In this note the decision problem of a strategic firm in a general equilibrium setting is analyzed. It is shown that a problem of unanimity arises when such a firm has many shareholders, and that a well known criterion used in the case of market incompleteness can be quite interestingly transposed to an imperfectly competitive framework.

Pages: 18
Date: 1989-09-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40722900 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
Working Paper: On a shareholder constrained efficient criterion for strategic firms (1999)
Working Paper: On a Shareholder Constrained Efficient Criterion for Strategic Firms (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:1989031

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastien SCHILLINGS (sebastien.schillings@uclouvain.be).