On a shareholder constrained efficient criterion for strategic firms

Luigi Ventura

No 1999031, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: In this note the decision problem of a strategic firm in a general equilibrium setting is analyzed. It is shown that a problem of unanimity arises when such a firm has many shareholders, an that a well known criterion used in the case of market incompleteness can be quite interestingly transposed to an imperfectly competitive framework.

JEL-codes: D21 D52 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 1999-09-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: On a Shareholder Constrained Efficient Criterion for Strategic Firms (1994)
Working Paper: On a shareholder constrained efficient criterion for strategic firms (1989)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:1999031

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