Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining

Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 1996041, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper deals with N-person sequential bargaining games with complete information (perfect or almost perfect information). For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements. Adopting a non-equilibrium approach, we show that N-person sequential bargaining games without exit are only solvable by a refinement of rationallzability for multi-stage games (trembling-hand rationalizability) if the players are sufficiently impatient. Nevertheless, N-person sequential bargaining games with exit are solvable by trembling-hand rationalizability whatever the players' impatience. That is, once we take up the non-equilibrium approach, the exit opportunity still fulfils its original aim: we achieve a unique solution by introducing the exit opportunity.

Keywords: sequential bargaining; N-person; rationallzability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-09-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining (1999)
Working Paper: Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1996041

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