Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining

Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 1421, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 1999-01-01
Note: In : Economic Theory, 14, 353-371, 1999
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Related works:
Journal Article: Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining (1999)
Working Paper: Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining (1996)
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