Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining

Vincent Vannetelbosch

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 14, issue 2, 353-371

Abstract: This paper deals with N-person sequential bargaining games with complete information. For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements. Adopting a non-equilibrium approach, we show that N-person sequential bargaining games with exit are solvable by a refinement of rationalizability for multi-stage games (trembling-hand rationalizability) whatever the impatience of the players. That is, once we adopt the non-equilibrium approach, the exit opportunity still fulfils its original aim: we achieve a unique solution by introducing the exit opportunity. Moreover, this unique solution is the unique SPE.

Keywords: Sequential bargaining; N-person; Rationalizability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-08-24
Note: Received: October 30, 1996; revised version: July 7, 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining (1999)
Working Paper: Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining (1996)
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