A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

Gian Luigi Albano, Fabrizio Germano and Stefano Lovo

No 1999052, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.

Date: 1999-10-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (2001)
Working Paper: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (2001)
Working Paper: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (2001)
Working Paper: A Comparison of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergies (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1999052

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