A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

Stefano Lovo, Fabrizio Germano and Gian Luigi Albano

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Abstract: In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions.

Keywords: Ascending auctions; Multi-unit auctions; Complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Economics Letters, 2001, Vol.71,n°1, pp.55-60. ⟨10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00394-3⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (2001)
Working Paper: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (2001)
Working Paper: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (1999)
Working Paper: A Comparison of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergies (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00460031

DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00394-3

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