A Comparison of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergies

Stefano Lovo, Gian Luigi Albano and Fabrizio Germano
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Gian Luigi Albano: Department of Economics - UCL - University College of London [London]

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Abstract: In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.

Keywords: Ascending auctions; Multi-unit auctions; Complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Published in 1999

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Related works:
Journal Article: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (2001)
Working Paper: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (2001)
Working Paper: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (2001)
Working Paper: A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00599418

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