Environmental negotiations as dynamic games: Why so selfish?

Raouf Boucekkine (), Jacek Krawczyk () and Thomas Vallee

No 2009010, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Keywords: pollution; technology adoption; optimal control; dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O41 Q56 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Environmental negotiations as dynamic games: Why so selfish ? (2009)
Working Paper: Environmental negotiations as dynamic games: Why so selfish? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2009010

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