A three-stage competition game in an air transport network under asymmetric valuation of flight frequencies

Oscar Alvarez-Sanjaime, Pedro Cantos-Sánchez, Rafael Moner-Colonques and José Sempere-Monerris
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Óscar Álvarez San-Jaime ()

No 3103, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 2020-01-01
Note: In : Economics of Transportation, Vol. 21, p. 100141 (2020)
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Journal Article: A three-stage competition game in an air transport network under asymmetric valuation of flight frequencies (2020)
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