Stricter employment protection and firms’ incentives to sponsor training: The case of French older workers
Pierre-Jean Messe and
Bénédicte Rouland
No 1206, CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) from CEPREMAP
Abstract:
From French data, this paper uses a difference-in-differences approach combined with propensity score matching to identify the effect of an exogenous change in employment protection among older workers on firm’s incentives to sponsor training. Laying off workers aged 50 and above, French firms have to pay a tax to the unemployment insurance system, known as the Delalande tax. In 1999, the measure was subjected to a reform that increased due taxes but that did not concern equally all firms. We find that this exogenous shock to employment protection for older workers substantially rises firms’ incentives to train the 45-49 age group of workers. This result confirms predictions of the simple labor market model we develop in a first stage.
Keywords: older workers; employment protection; firms’ training incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J14 J24 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-bec, nep-dem, nep-eur, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Stricter employment protection and firms' incentives to sponsor training: The case of French older workers (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpm:docweb:1206
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