Stricter employment protection and firms' incentives to sponsor training: The case of French older workers

Pierre-Jean Messe and Bénédicte Rouland

Labour Economics, 2014, vol. 31, issue C, 14-26

Abstract: This paper uses a difference-in-differences approach, combined with propensity score matching, to identify the effect of older workers employment protection on French firms' incentives to sponsor training. Between 1987 and 2008, French firms laying off workers aged over 50 had to pay a tax to the unemployment insurance system, known as the Delalande tax. In 1999, the measure was subjected to a reform that increased the tax, but only for large firms. We find that this exogenous increase substantially raised firms' incentives to train workers aged 45–49 but had no impact on the training rates among workers aged over 50. From a simple model with endogenous firing and training decisions, we give a theoretical illustration of these results.

Keywords: Evaluation; Firms' training incentives; Employment protection; Older workers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J14 J24 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537114000876
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Stricter employment protection and firms’ incentives to sponsor training: The case of French older workers (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:31:y:2014:i:c:p:14-26

DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2014.07.004

Access Statistics for this article

Labour Economics is currently edited by A. Ichino

More articles in Labour Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().