Storable Votes and Judicial Nominations in the U.S. Senate

Alessandra Casella, Turban, Sébastien and Gregory Wawro

No 10158, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We model a procedural reform aimed at restoring a proper role for the minority in the confirmation process of judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate. We propose that nominations to the same level court be collected in periodic lists and voted upon individually with Storable Votes, allowing each senator to allocate freely a fixed number of total votes. Although each nomination is decided by simple majority, storable votes make it possible for the minority to win occasionally, but only when the relative importance its members assign to a nomination is higher than the relative importance assigned by the majority. Numerical simulations, motivated by a game theoretic model, show that under plausible assumptions a minority of 45 senators would be able to block between 20 and 35 percent of nominees. For most parameter values, the possibility of minority victories increases aggregate welfare.

Keywords: Filibuster; Judiciary; Senate; Storable votes; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Storable votes and judicial nominations in the US Senate (2017)
Working Paper: Storable Votes and Judicial Nominations in the U.S. Senate (2014)
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