Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory

Micael Castanheira, Laurent Bouton and Aniol Llorente-Saguer

No 10481, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an assumption in those models: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose the first direct empirical evidence of the effect of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions: sincere voting is a predominant strategy under aggregate uncertainty, whereas without aggregate uncertainty, voters massively coordinate their votes behind one candidate, who wins almost surely.

Keywords: Aggregate uncertainty; Experiments; Multicandidate elections; Plurality; Rational-voter model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory (2017)
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2017)
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2015)
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2015)
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