Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory

Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira and Aniol Llorente-Saguer

No 778, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: The rational-voter model is often criticised on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's Law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an (arguably unrealistic) assumption: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose direct empirical evidence of the effect of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favours the emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions: sincere voting is a predominant strategy under aggregate uncertainty, whereas without aggregate uncertainty, voters massively coordinate their votes behind one candidate, who wins almost surely.

Keywords: Rational voter model; Multicandidate elections; Plurality; Aggregate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-20
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory (2017)
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2015)
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:778

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