Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory

Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira and Aniol Llorente-Saguer

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's Law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an (arguably unrealistic) assumption: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose direct empirical evidence of the effects of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Aggregate uncertainty; Experiments; Multicandidate elections; Plurality; Rational voter model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in: Games and economic behavior (2017)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory (2017)
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2015)
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2015)
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/242106

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