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Culture, Institutions and Democratization

Gérard Roland and Yuriy Gorodnichenko

No 10563, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under an individualistic and a collectivist culture. The main result is that, despite facing potentially larger collective action problems, countries with an individualistic culture are more likely to end up adopting democracy faster than countries with a collectivist culture. Our instrumental variable estimation suggests a strong and robust effect of individualistic culture on average polity scores and length of democracy, even after controlling for other determinants of democracy emphasized in the literature. We also give evidence that countries with collectivist culture are also more likely to experience autocratic breakdowns and transitions from autocracy to autocracy.

Keywords: Collective action; Collectivism; Culture; Democratization; Individualism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 P48 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cul and nep-soc
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Related works:
Journal Article: Culture, institutions and democratization* (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Culture, Institutions and Democratization (2015) Downloads
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