Culture, Institutions and Democratization

Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Gérard Roland

No 21117, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under individualistic and collectivist cultures. The main result is that, despite facing potentially larger collective action problems, countries with an individualistic culture are more likely to end up adopting democracy earlier than countries with a collectivist culture. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong and robust association between individualistic culture and average polity scores and length of democracy, even after controlling for other determinants of democracy emphasized in the literature. We provide evidence that countries with collectivist culture are also more likely to experience autocratic breakdowns and transitions from autocracy to autocracy.

JEL-codes: H1 P48 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

Published as Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Gerard Roland, 2021. "Culture, institutions and democratization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 165-195, April.
Published as Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Gerard Roland, 2021. "Culture, institutions and democratization*," Public Choice, vol 187(1-2), pages 165-195.

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Journal Article: Culture, institutions and democratization* (2021)
Working Paper: Culture, Institutions and Democratization (2015)
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