Governance and the Effectiveness of Public Health Subsidies

Pascaline Dupas, Jonathan Robinson and Rebecca Dizon-Ross

No 10690, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Heavily subsidizing essential health products through existing health infrastructure has the potential to substantially decrease child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. There is, however, widespread concern that poor governance and in particular limited accountability among health workers seriously undermines the effectiveness of such programs. We performed innovative audits on bed net distribution programs in three countries (Ghana, Kenya and Uganda) to investigate local agency problems and their determinants in the allocation of targeted subsidies. Overall, agency concerns appear modest. Around 80% of the eligible receive the subsidy as intended and leakage to the ineligible appears limited, even when the ineligible have a high willingness to pay. The estimated level of mistargeting only modestly affects the cost-effectiveness of free distribution.

Keywords: Extortion; Leakage; Motivation; Shirking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H11 I15 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dev and nep-hea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Governance and the Effectiveness of Public Health Subsidies (2015)
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