Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives

Margaret Meyer and John Vickers

No 1107, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: It is well known that comparative performance information (CPI) can enhance efficiency in static principal-agent relationships by improving the trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts. In dynamic settings, however, there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives (e.g. managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation). We show that the dynamic effects of CPI on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar (static) insurance effect and can in either case be the dominant factor affecting efficiency. The overall welfare effects of CPI are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure.

Keywords: Incentives; Performance Comparisons; Rachet Effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 J33 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Journal Article: Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives (1997)
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