Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment

Bas van der Klaauw, Jonneke Bolhaar and Nadine Ketel

No 11165, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper studies mandatory job-search periods for welfare applicants. During this period the benefits application is put on hold and the applicant is obliged to make job applications. We combine a randomized experiment with detailed administrative data to investigate the effects of imposing a job-search period. We find strong and persistent effects on the probability to collect welfare benefits. The reduced benefits are fully compensated by increased earnings from work. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of adverse consequences for the most vulnerable applicants. Our results therefore suggest that a job-search period is an effective instrument for targeting welfare-benefits applicants.

Keywords: Job search; Welfare-to-work; Active labor-market policies; Randomized experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 C93 I38 J08 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Job Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment (2019)
Working Paper: Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment (2016)
Working Paper: Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment (2016)
Working Paper: Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment (2016)
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