A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability

Allan Drazen, S. Boragan Aruoba and Razvan Vlaicu

No 11331, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. We Â…find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort, that is, a disciplining effect. We also Â…find a positive but weaker selection effect. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4:2% compared to a one-term regime. JEL

Keywords: Discipline; Selection; Political agency; Elections; Structural estimation; Maximum likelihood (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 D72 D73 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Working Paper: A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability (2015)
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