A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability
S. Boragan Aruoba (),
Allan Drazen () and
No 21151, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors for 1982-2012. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort. We also find a selection effect, although it is weaker in terms of its effect on average governor performance. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2% compared to a one-term regime, and find that a three-term regime may improve voter welfare even further.
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published as S. Borağan Aruoba & Allan Drazen & Razvan Vlaicu, 2018. "A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY," International Economic Review, .
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Working Paper: A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability (2016)
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