Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry

Luigi Zingales and Mara Faccio ()

No 11794, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study how political factors shape competition in the mobile telecommunication sector. We show that the way a government designs the rules of the game has an impact on concentration, competition, and prices. Pro-competition regulation reduces prices, but does not hurt quality of services or investments. More democratic governments tend to design more competitive rules, while more politically connected operators are able to distort the rules in their favor, restricting competition. Government intervention has large redistributive effects: U.S. consumers would gain $65bn a year if U.S. mobile service prices were in line with German ones and $44bn if they were in line with Danish ones.

Keywords: Political economy; Capture; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-pay, nep-pol and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Working Paper: Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry (2017)
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