Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry

Mara Faccio () and Luigi Zingales

No 23041, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how political factors shape competition in the mobile telecommunication sector. We show that the way a government designs the rules of the game has an impact on concentration, competition, and prices. Pro-competition regulation reduces prices, but does not hurt quality of services or investments. More democratic governments tend to design more competitive rules, while more politically connected operators are able to distort the rules in their favor, restricting competition. Government intervention has large redistributive effects: U.S. consumers would gain $65bn a year if U.S. mobile service prices were in line with German ones and $44bn if they were in line with Danish ones.

JEL-codes: D72 L11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com, nep-pay, nep-pol and nep-reg
Note: CF POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Published as Mara Faccio & Luigi Zingales & Lauren Cohen, 2022. "Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry," The Review of Financial Studies, vol 35(4), pages 1983-2018.

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Working Paper: Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry (2017)
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