Transparency, Investor Information Acquisition, and Money Market Fund Risk Rebalancing during the 2011-12 Eurozone Crisis

Allan Timmermann, Lawrence Schmidt, , and Russell Wermers ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Emily A. Gallagher

No 11895, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Abstract We study investor redemptions and portfolio rebalancing decisions of money market mutual funds (MMFs) during the Eurozone crisis. We exploit the multiple shareclass structure of the MMF industry and the detailed portfolio holdings disclosure required by 2010 regulatory changes to highlight costs and benefits of increased transparency in short-term funding markets. Consistent with theoretical predictions of models featuring costly (and incomplete) information acquisition, investors with the lowest information acquisition costs are most responsive to cross-sectional heterogeneity in funds' exposures to Eurozone securities. Moreover, managers catering to these investors disproportionately shift their portfolios away from the riskiest and most information-sensitive securities.

Keywords: Money market funds; Eurozone crisis; Financial fragility; Endogenous information acquisition; Transparency in short-term funding markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G21 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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