Self-worth versus net worth: Image motivation and the quantity-quality trade-off
No 12208, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Self-image concerns can motivate behaviour over which it is difficult to contract. We investigate how self-image concerns impact the quantity-quality trade-off of professionals, independent of external reputation. To do so, we use a framed field experiment with judges. The experiment measures the effect of self-image concerns compared to that of a bonus and to that of combing both incentives. We find that while both incentives increase the quantity of work, bonuses generate much worse quality. Subjects are less willing to engage in opportunistic behaviour to earn the bonus, however, if a peer might see their work, albeit anonymously.
Keywords: intrinsic incentives; judges; professionalism; real-effort task; Self-image; Tajikistan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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