Advertising Spending and Media Bias: Evidence from News Coverage of Car Safety Recalls

Brian Kinght, Graham Beattie () and Ananya Sen
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Brian G. Knight and Ruben Durante

No 12366, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Do news media bias content in favor of advertisers? We examine the relationship between advertising by auto manufacturers in U.S. newspapers and news coverage of car safety recalls. This context allows us to separate the influence of advertisers, who prefer less coverage, from that of readers, who demand more. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that newspapers provide less coverage of recalls by their advertisers, especially the more severe ones. Competition for readers from other newspapers mitigates bias, while competition for advertising by online platforms exacerbates it. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that lower coverage increases auto fatalities.

Keywords: Media bias; Advertising; Newspapers; Car manufacturers; Safety recalls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mkt and nep-tre
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Advertising Spending and Media Bias: Evidence from News Coverage of Car Safety Recalls (2021)
Working Paper: Advertising Spending and Media Bias: Evidence from News Coverage of Car Safety Recalls (2017)
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