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The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions

Samuel Bazzi and Matthew Gudgeon

No 12552, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper argues that redrawing subnational political boundaries can transform ethnic divisions. We use a natural policy experiment in Indonesia to show how the effects of ethnic diversity on conflict depend on the political units within which groups are organized. Redistricting along group lines can reduce conflict, but these gains are undone or even reversed when the new borders introduce greater polarization. These adverse effects of polarization are further amplified around majoritarian elections, consistent with strong incentives to capture new local governments in settings with ethnic favoritism. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redistricting in diverse countries.

Keywords: conflict; Decentralization; Ethnic Divisions; Polarization; Political Boundaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 H41 H77 O13 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pol, nep-sea and nep-ure
Date: 2018-01
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Working Paper: The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions (2017) Downloads
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