The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions
Samuel Bazzi and
No 24625, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper argues that redrawing subnational political boundaries can transform ethnic divisions. We use a natural policy experiment in Indonesia to show how the effects of ethnic diversity on conflict depend on the political units within which groups are organized. Redistricting along group lines can reduce conflict, but these gains are undone or even reversed when the new borders introduce greater polarization. These adverse effects of polarization are further amplified around majoritarian elections, consistent with strong incentives to capture new local governments in settings with ethnic favoritism. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redistricting in diverse countries.
JEL-codes: D72 D74 H41 H77 O12 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol, nep-sea and nep-ure
Note: DEV PE POL
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Working Paper: The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions (2018)
Working Paper: The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions (2017)
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