A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions

Micael Castanheira, Laurent Bouton and Allan Drazen

No 12789, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We present a model of electorally-motivated, small campaign contributions. The analysis uncovers interesting interactions among small donors and has novel implications for the effect of income inequality on total contributions and election outcomes. Moreover, it helps explain a number of empirical observations that seem anomalous when contributions are driven by the consumption or the influence motives. We also study the impact of different forms of campaign finance laws on contribution behavior, probabilities of electoral outcomes, and welfare. Our results are consistent with more behaviorally motivated donors when contributions are driven by the parties' strategic solicitation of funds. We also indicate how the model and its results may have important implications for empirical work on campaign contributions.

Keywords: Campaign contributions; Campaign finance laws; Electoral motive; Income inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions (2024)
Working Paper: A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions (2020)
Working Paper: A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions (2018)
Working Paper: A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions (2018)
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