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A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions

Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira and Allan Drazen ()

No 24413, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We propose a theory of small campaign contributions driven by an electoral motive, i.e., the desire to influence election outcomes. Though small donors take as given the actions of others, strategic interactions induce patterns consistent with empirical findings, e.g., election closeness and underdog effects. We also study different forms of campaign finance laws, and show why caps should be combined with a progressive tax on contributions. Next, we introduce large donors and show that several conclusions in the literature may be significantly modified by the interaction with small donors. Throughout, we discuss the empirical implications of our findings.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions (2018) Downloads
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