The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment
Florian Englmaier (),
David Schindler () and
Simeon Schudy ()
No 13226, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers' willingness to "explore" original solutions.
Keywords: bonus; exploration; gain; incentives; loss; non-routine; team work (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C93 D03 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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Working Paper: The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence From a Field Experiment (2018)
Working Paper: The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Teams Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment (2018)
Working Paper: The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks – Evidence from a Field Experiment (2018)
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