Biased Policy Professionals

Stefan Dercon, Sheheryar Banuri and Varun Gauri

No 13289, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Although the decisions of policy professionals are often more consequential than those of individuals in their private capacity, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a novel subject pool of development policy professionals (public servants of the World Bank and the Department for International Development in the UK) show that policy professionals are indeed subject to decision making traps, including the effects of framing outcomes as losses or gains, and most strikingly, confirmation bias driven by ideological predisposition, despite having an explicit mission to promote evidence-informed and impartial decision making. These findings should worry policy professionals and their principals in governments and large organizations, as well as citizens themselves. A further experiment, in which policy professionals engage in discussion, shows that deliberation may be able to mitigate the effects of some of these biases.

Keywords: Behavioural economics; Bureaucracy; Evidence-based policy making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Biased Policy Professionals (2019)
Working Paper: Biased Policy Professionals (2019)
Working Paper: Biased Policy Professionals (2018)
Working Paper: Biased Policy Professionals (2018)
Working Paper: Biased policy professionals (2017)
Working Paper: Biased policy professionals (2017)
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