Preparing for the Worst But Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion
Piotr Dworczak () and
No 15017, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We propose a robust solution concept for Bayesian persuasion that accounts for the Sender's ambiguity over (i) the exogenous sources of information the Receivers may learn from, and (ii) the way the Receivers play (when multiple strategy profiles are consistent with the assumed solution concept and the available information). The Sender proceeds in two steps. First, she identifies all information structures that yield the largest payoff in the "worst-case scenario," i.e., when Nature provides information and coordinates the Receivers' play to minimize the Sender's payoff. Second, she picks an information structure that, in case Nature and the Receivers play favorably to her, maximizes her expected payoff over all information structures that are "worst-case optimal." We characterize properties of robust solutions, identify conditions under which robustness requires separation of certain states, and qualify in what sense robustness calls for more information disclosure than standard Bayesian persuasion. Finally, we discuss how some of the results in the Bayesian persuasion literature change once robustness is accounted for.
Keywords: information design; Persuasion; robustness; worst-case optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at email@example.com
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15017
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=15017
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().