The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy

Bruno Jullien and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

No 15071, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature with a view toward competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition can emerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underline the role of dynamics, but also of platform differentiation, consumers multihoming and beliefs to allow competition in platform markets. Second, we analyze competition policy issues and discuss how rules designed for standard markets can perform in two-sided markets. We show that multi-sided externalities create new opportunities for anti-competitive conducts, often related to pricing and contractual imperfections.

Keywords: Networks; Platforms; Two-sided markets; Competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L13 L41 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-pay
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy (2021)
Working Paper: The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy (2021)
Working Paper: The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy (2020)
Working Paper: The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy (2020)
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