Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party

Francesco Trebbi, Patrick Francois () and Kairong Xiao

No 15226, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper investigates, theoretically and empirically, factional arrangements within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the governing political party of the People's Republic of China. Using detailed biographical information of political elites in the Central Committee and provincial governments, we present a set of new empirical regularities within the CCP, including systematic patterns of cross-factional balancing at different levels of the political hierarchy and substantial faction premia in promotions. We propose and estimate an organizational economic model to characterize factional politics within single-party nondemocratic regimes.

Keywords: China; Political economy; Factions; Chinese communist party; Single party regime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P3 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08
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Related works:
Journal Article: Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence From the Chinese Communist Party (2023)
Working Paper: Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party (2016)
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