Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party
Patrick Francois (francois@interchange.ubc.ca),
Francesco Trebbi and
Kairong Xiao
No 22775, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the factional arrangements and dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the governing political party of the People's Republic of China. Our empirical analysis ranges from the end of the Deng Xiaoping era to the current Xi Jinping presidency and covers the appointments of both national and provincial officials. We present a set of new empirical regularities within the CCP and a theoretical framework suited to model factional politics within single-party regimes.
JEL-codes: P3 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-pol and nep-tra
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)
Published as Patrick Francois & Francesco Trebbi & Kairong Xiao, 2023. "Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence From the Chinese Communist Party," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(2), pages 565-603, March.
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Related works:
Journal Article: Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence From the Chinese Communist Party (2023)
Working Paper: Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party (2020)
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