The Focusing Effect in Negotiations
Heiko Karle and
Andrea Canidio
No 15698, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Two players with preferences distorted by the focusing effect (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013) negotiate an agreement over several issues and one transfer. Our main result is that, as long as their preferences are differentially distorted, an issue will be inefficiently left out of the agreement or inefficiently included in the agreement whenever the importance of the other issues on the table is sufficiently large. When this is the case, the salience of the transfer dimension is large for both players, but differentially so, therefore creating a form of disagreement between them. In extreme cases, this could lead to an inefficient breakdown of the negotiation. Anticipating this possibility, the negotiating parties may negotiate in stages, by first signing an incomplete agreement and later finalizing the outcome of the negotiation. As in Raiffa (1982), these incomplete agreements may impose bounds on some dimensions of the bargaining solution in order to reduce their salience.
Keywords: Salience; Focusing effect; Bargaining; Negotiations; Incomplete agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D03 D86 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15698 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Journal Article: The focusing effect in negotiations (2022) 
Working Paper: The Focusing Effect in Negotiations (2021) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15698
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15698
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().