Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation

Clemence Tricaud

No 15999, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper provides new evidence on why municipalities are often reluctant to integrate. Exploiting a French reform that made intermunicipal cooperation mandatory, I find that urban municipalities forced to integrate experienced a large increase in construction, consistent with NIMBYism explaining their resistance, while rural municipalities ended up with fewer local public services. I do not find the same effects for municipalities that had voluntarily integrated prior to the law, while both types of municipality enjoyed similar benefits in terms of public transport and fiscal revenues. These findings support the fact that municipalities resisted to avoid the local costs of integration.

Keywords: Local governments; Intermunicipal cooperation; Difference-in-differences; Housing regulations; Local public services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H70 R52 R53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15999 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15999

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15999

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().