Sticky Spending, Sequestration, and Government Debt
Facundo Piguillem () and
Alessandro Riboni ()
No 16294, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Once established, government spending programs tend to continue. Spending inertia can lead to unsustainable debt levels that require fiscal stabilization, such as "sequestration." We develop a political economy model of debt with sticky spending by assuming that the government must maintain a fraction of past spending. We show that inertia insures against the risk of political turnover, which may reduce politicians' incentives to accumulate debt. However, if preexisting commitments are large, as in the current U.S. context, inertia exacerbates incentives to increase debt; faced with the prospect of stabilization, the government overspends to "dilute" the spending commitments of past administrations.
Keywords: Budgetary Inertia; Delayed Stabilization; Entitlement Spending Reform; Government Debt; Mandatory and Discretionary Spending (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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