Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms
Eloisa Campioni and
No 16807, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We study competing-mechanism games, in which several principals contract with several privately informed agents. We show that enabling principals to engage into private disclosures - whereby a principal sends to the agents contractible private signals about how her final decision will respond to the agents' messages - can significantly affect the predictions of such games. Our first result is that equilibrium outcomes and payoffs of games without private disclosures need no longer be supported once private disclosures are allowed for. This challenges the robustness of the folk theorems Ã la Yamashita (2010). Our second result is that allowing for private disclosures may generate equilibrium outcomes and payoffs that cannot be supported in any game without private disclosures, no matter how rich the message spaces are. This challenges the canonicity of the universal mechanisms of Epstein and Peters (1999). These findings call for a novel approach to the analysis of competing-mechanism games.
Keywords: Incomplete information; Competing mechanisms; Private disclosures; Folk theorems; Universal mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms (2023)
Working Paper: Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (2023)
Working Paper: Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (2021)
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