Bargaining over Royalties in the Shadow of Litigation

Fabian Griem and Roman Inderst

No 16902, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We model negotiations over patent royalties in the shadow of litigation through a Nash-in-Nash approach, where outside options, triggered in case of disagreement, are derived from a subsequent game of litigation. The outcome of litigation depends both on "hard determinants", such as relative patent strength, and on "soft determinants", such as parties' efficacy in litigation or their (known) preparedness to disrupt negotiations in favor of litigation. Amongst other things, this has implications for the interpretation of observed royalties in empirical analysis.

Keywords: Royalties; Litigation; Nash-in-nash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D45 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP16902 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining over Royalties in the Shadow of Litigation (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16902

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP16902

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().