Comparative Politics and Public Finance

Torsten Persson (), Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini

No 1737, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper presents a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government.

Keywords: comparative politics; electoral accountability; legislative cohesion; political economics; Public Finance; Separation of Powers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Comparative Politics and Public Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Comparative Politics and Public Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Comparative Politics and Public Finance
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