School choice and neighborhood sorting: Equilibrium consequences of geographic school admissions

Ellen Greaves and Hélène Turon

No 18886, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Geographic school admissions criteria bind residential and school choices for some parents, and could create externalities in equilibrium for non-parents through displacement or higher rent. Through a dynamic structural model, we show that the policy decision of geographic versus non-geographic school admissions criteria has important implications for equilibrium outcomes in school and housing markets. Geographic admissions criteria segregate schools, but integrate neighborhoods according to income. Incorporating non-parents into the model challenges the existing understanding of how public schools affect the housing market: non-parent households dampen the equilibrium price premium around popular schools; non-parent households are never better off under geographic admissions.

Keywords: School; choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I24 R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
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Related works:
Working Paper: School Choice and Neighborhood Sorting: Equilibrium Consequences of Geographic School Admissions (2024)
Working Paper: School choice and neighborhood sorting: Equilibrium consequences of geographic school admissions (2023)
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