School Choice and Neighborhood Sorting: Equilibrium Consequences of Geographic School Admissions

Ellen Greaves () and Hélène Turon
Additional contact information
Ellen Greaves: University of Exeter

No 16805, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Geographic school admissions criteria bind residential and school choices for some parents, and could create externalities in equilibrium for non-parents through displacement or higher rent. Through a dynamic structural model, we show that the policy decision of geographic versus non-geographic school admissions criteria has important implications for equilibrium outcomes in school and housing markets. Geographic admissions criteria segregate schools, but integrate neighborhoods according to income. Incorporating non-parents into the model challenges the existing understanding of how public schools affect the housing market: non-parent households dampen the equilibrium price premium around popular schools; non-parent households are never better off under geographic admissions.

Keywords: school choice; residential choice; school admissions criteria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I24 R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-ure
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https://docs.iza.org/dp16805.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: School choice and neighborhood sorting: Equilibrium consequences of geographic school admissions (2024)
Working Paper: School choice and neighborhood sorting: Equilibrium consequences of geographic school admissions (2023)
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