Keeping Up Appearances: An Experimental Investigation of Relative Rank Signaling

Pascaline Dupas, Marcel Fafchamps and Laura Hernandez-Nunez

No 19092, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We investigate the potential welfare cost of relative rank considerations using a series of vignettes and lab-in-the-field experiments with over 2,000 individuals in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. We show that: (1) individuals judged to be of a lower rank are perceived as more likely to be sidelined from beneficial opportunities in many aspects of life; and (2) in response, individuals distort their appearance and consumption choices in order to appear of higher rank. These effects are strong and economically significant. As predicted by a simple signaling model, the distortion is larger for individuals with low (but not too low) socio-economic status.

JEL-codes: D12 D63 J71 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
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Working Paper: Keeping Up Appearances: An Experimental Investigation of Relative Rank Signaling (2024)
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